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It is easy to hear or read a metaphor and identify it as such. It is
harder to say just what a metaphor does or how it does it. Metaphor
departs from the standard use of a word or words to express some
other meaning that typical prosaic language could not achieve.
Perhaps it is this ability to communicate meaning beyond the scope
of ordinary usages of words that makes the use of metaphor so
popular. Whatever the source of its popularity, as an unconven
tional, yet highly effective semiotic device, we might begin to won
der about its origins. How is it that language, with its ability to
convey meaning through its arbitrary sounds and relationships, can
break its ownrules to convey even more meaning? Is there (1) a more
fundamental relationship between things in the world on which this
stretching of the structure of language relies or (2) does metaphor
achieve its higher meaning through a fabrication that is just as
arbitrary as the vocalized sounds which make up language?
Aristotle's theory of metaphor affirms the former in order to
understand how language can break its own rules and still convoy
more meaning. Aristotle's realist theory of metaphor helps us an
swer some difficult questions about how metaphor functions since it
prescribes some limits to the subjects that may be properly used in a
, metaphor. For Aristotle, there is some essential similarity between
the actual objects compared which serves as the basis for a successful
metaphor. One of the key differences between a good and bad
metaphor is the selection of fitting terms. Aristotle says that the
ability to create metaphors is II a sign of genius, since a good
metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in
dissimilars" (P 1459a).1 But just how this functioning of'genius' takes
place is left out of Aristotle's description.
Aristotle's theory of metaphor commits him to at least the mini~
mal claim that objects actually contain properties since metaphor is
supposed to utilize similarities actually found in the objects that are
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compared to each other. Thomas Reid's realism is similar in that he
believes that objects really possess the characteristics which some
philosophers (he thinks) are too quick to relegate to the realm of mere
sensations. In order to explain the gap between our sensations and
our awareness of material bodies, Reid theorizes that (as Derose
says) "sensations 'naturally suggest' or are 'natural signs' for the
qualities of bodies" (322). As a result of the realism which Aristotle
and Reid share, we can use Reid's theory of natural signs to give a
plausible account of the workings of, and problems related to,
Aristotle's idea of genius.
We begin by exploring how Aristotle's theory of metaphor
commits him to the type of realism I have attributed to him. For
Aristotle, "[m]etaphor consists in giving the thing a name that
belongs to something else" (P 1457b). The nature of this relationship
seems a bit oversimplified. This definition seems to allow for the
giving of anything the name that belongs to any other thing. It is clear
from Aristotle's formalism towards the creation of metaphors as
expounded in the Rhetoric, however, that Aristotle does not think
metaphor creation is so open ended: [m]etaphors ... must befitting,
which means that they must fairly correspond to the thing signified"
(R1405a). There are a few ways a metaphor may be" amiss" (R1405a)
but the most crucial of these ways is the failure to pick subjects of
metaphor which are similar in some essential way.
Aristotle also tells us that [0]ne term may describe a thing more
truly than another, may be more like it, and set it more intimately
before our eyes" (R 1405b). It is clear from this statement that, for.
Aristotle, there is such a thing as good and bad metaphor making.
Already we can see that not just any word can be used metaphori
cally with any other word for lithe want of harmony between two
things is emphasized by their being placed side by side" (R1405a).
Not only is the choice of terms determined by some internal similar
ity, butto choose incorrectly exposes the failure of the choice since the
subjects of the metaphor are juxtaposed as a necessary part of the
form of metaphor.
The right or 'fitting' way to construct a metaphor requires "an
intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars" (P 1459a). The
similarity that a person with 'intuitive perception' (genius) can pick
out is not an obvious or traditionally appreciated kind of similarity.
If it were, the use of metaphor could be substituted by the standard
employment of language in prosaic form but "[m]etaphor gives
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style, clearness, charm, and distinction as nothing else can" and,
unlike the ability to utilize and master ordinary speech, [metaphor]
is not a thing whose use can be taught by one man to another" (R
1405a). This mastery of metaphor which cannot be taught by another
is the power of genius which Aristotle identifies in the Poetics.
Similarity can manifest itself in many different ways. Words, for
example, can have similar sounding words, but Aristotle specifically
has the hidden similarity of things in the real world (in 18th century
terms, he has an anti-sensationalist view of the similarity of things
compared with metaphor) in mind: "Metaphors must be drawn ...
from things that are related to the original thing, and yet not obviously
so related" (R 1412a, my emphasis). These 'original things' mostly
include actual objects in the world which have specific, similar
properties, but they can also include things like actions: in one of his
examples of a fitting metaphor, Aristotle uses the substitution of the
word "draw" for "sever" (P 1457b).
It is not so crucial to note that Aristotle's theory of metaphor
hinges on the use of similar objects in the real world. It is, however,
very important to realize that the properties Aristotle believes make
terms proper subjects for metaphors are independent of the term; the
properties are a part of the term but only because the term points to
something real (whether it be an object or an action or whatever) that
actually has those characteristics. Metaphors are only as good as the
similarities they point out between real things with real characteris
tics, they do not simply"create similarity and resemblance" (Danesi
323) out of two completely dissimilar things.
It is clear that Aristotle's theory of metaphor is grounded on the
real existence of things and the properties they possess. Further
more, Aristotle says that the ability to construct metaphors is depen
denton the ability to grasp hidden similarities in things that are
otherwise (on the surface) completely dissimilar. But how can we
make sense of this power of genius? It is the power of genius which
makes a person able to create fitting metaphors. Genius is an ability
to pick out similarities that are already in dissimilar things and put
them into metaphorical form, though not everyone has this ability.
Moreover, genius is not a thing that one person can teach another.
Genius, then, must be a power that is either developed through
specific types of life experience (independent of a human /I teacher")
or one with which a person is born. Regardless oHhe cause of genius,
the odd thing is that the experience of the power of metaphor is not
II
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restricted to those with genius. In other words, although only those
with genius can create metaphors, a great many more people can
receive and appreciate metaphors. Once similarities in seemingly
dissimilars are brought to their attention by the person with genius,
these receivers can appreciate the subtle similarities in otherwise
dissimilar things. If this were not the case, the power of metaphor
would be severely restricted since it would only be useful to those
with the power of genius in the first place. Indeed, it is hard to believe
that Aristotle would claim that rhetoriticians "must pay careful
attention to metaphor" (R 1405a) when "the technical study of
rhetoric is concerned with the modes of persuasion" (R 1355a) and
these 'modes of persuasion' must be "notions possessed by every
body" (R 1355a) in order for rhetoric to effectively persuade.
Now that it is clear that even those without genius can appreciate
the similarities made explicit through metaphor, a new question
arises. We no longer need to know how the power of genius works,
instead we need to understand how universal appreciation of meta
phor can take place without universal possession of genius. One
plausible explanation for the intelligibility of this state of affairs can
be given using Reid's concept of natural signs. Before we can under
stand how Reid's natural signs can explain Aristotle's porblematic
theory of metaphor reception, it is important that we explore some of
their characteristics.
Reid defines natural signs in contradistinction to artificial signs.
Artificial signs are those which" [arise] from some agreement among
mankind" (LFA 29).2 Artificial signs are purely arbitrary signs which
do signify, but only because they have been designated and learned
by some group of people. Natural signs, on the other hand, "are
understood by anyone, as smoke is universally understood to show
that there is fire or as a sign of fire" (LFA 29). There are three types
ofnatural signs which are distinguished by the manners in which the
connection of sign to that which is signified is made apparent in
humans. The connection of the first kind of natural sign to its obje~t
is made through experience. The example of smoke being a natural
sign of fire is an example of one such natural sign since, although the
connection of the sign to the object is natural, it is only through
experience that we can come to know this connection. The second
type of natural sign is "not only established by nature but discovered
to us by a natural principle, without reasoning or experience" (IHM
44). An example of this type of natural sign is the facial expression
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one makes when expressing a certain emotion. The ability to under
stand these expressions is not gained by experience, but is a product
of lithe constitution of human nature" (LFA 30). The third type of
natural sign suggests things of which we "never before had any
notion or conception but give us grounds to "create a belief of
[them]" (IHM44). I will focus on the second type of natural sign since
it is "the foundation of the fine arts, or of taste" (IBM 45) and the
understanding of metaphor falls under the category of taste.
While exploring the notion of grandeur as an attribute of things
which please taste, Reid makes it clear that "power, wisdom, and
goodness, are properly the attributes of mind only. They are ascribed
to the work figuratively, but are really inherent in the author" (EIP
496). He asks the question: "ls there no real grandeur in material
objects?/I (ErP 497). Reid asks this question because he seems to have
gotten himself into trouble with one of his earlier claims-namely,
that the object has its excellence from its own constitution, and not
from ours" (EIP 495).
In "Objectivity and Expression in Thomas Reid's Aesthetics/'
Josefine Nauckhoff solves this seemingly devastating problem by
explaining how attributes of mind may subsist in objects through the
presence of natural ~igns (of the second type). Natural signs function
as material significations of attributes of mind. Nauckhoff explains
how uReid thinks we have direct access to the meaning of these signs.
We do not need to interpret them in order to know what they
express" (187). The truth of this statement lies in the fact that natural
signs about which she is speaking fall under the second type of
natural signs that are discovered to us by a natural principle,
without reasoning or experience" (IBM 44). The upshot of our
having direct access to this type of natural sign is that "we do not
need to 'read' excellence 'into' a sign which naturally signifies an
excellencei rather, the excellence is directly expressed by the sign"
(Nauckhoff 187). Now it should be clear how the excellence is both
in the object as expressed through natural signs as well as originally
the '[attribute} of mind only.'
It is important that natural signs do more than merely point to
excellence since Reid presents a theory of metaphor based on their
actual similarities:
ll
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those that are most different in kind, have innumerable
similitudes, relations, and analogies, which we contemplate
with pleasure, and which lead us naturally to borrow words
and attributes from one object to express what belongs to
another. The greatest part of every language under heaven is
made up of words borrowed from one thing, and applied to
something supposed to have some relation or analogy to
their first signification. The attributes of body we ascribe to
mind, and the attributes of mind to material objects (EIP 501).
Just like Aristotle, Reid theorizes that metaphors are created as a
result of "innumerable similitudes, relations, and analogies which
we contemplate with pleasure." For Reid the creation of a metaphor
takes place "by ascribing to [the objects of sense] intellectual qualities
which have some analogy to those they really possess" (EIP 497, my
emphasis). On Reid's account, creation of a metaphor means more
than for Aristotle since a basis in objects of sense is a basis in natural

signs.
How does all of this help us with the problem of universal
reception of metaphor in Aristotle's theory? Recall that Aristotle
thinks that genius "implies an intuitive perception of tlle similarity
in dissimilars" that"cannot be learnt from others." For Aristotle,
those subjects that are capable of systematic study are rightly defined
as arts. The man of art is thought to be wiser than the man of
experience "because the former know [s] the cause, but the latter
do[ es] not" (M 981a). Because of the conceptual nature of an art, the
artist can teach, and therefore we think art more truly knowledge
than experience is" (M 981b). Since the conceptual nature of art is the
characteristic which makes art teachable, it follows that something
that is notteachable must not be based on concepts. 3 The importance
of the unteachable nature of the power of genius is now clear: genius
is non-conceptual.
The non-conceptual nature of the foundations of Aristotle's
theory of metaphor is crucial to its relationship with Reid's natural
signs of the second type. Recall that the reason these signs need no
interpretation is because they are discovered to us by a natural
principle, without reasoning or experience." So we know tllat the
natural signs on which metaphors are based are not the product of
reasoning. Reasoning deals with concepts, so we can say that natural
signs - Reid's basis for the reality of metaphor - are non-conceptuaL
II
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Furthermore, if we substitute similarity of Reid's natural signs as the
basis for metaphor for Aristotle's ambiguous similarity in
dissimilars," we get a non-conceptual basis for a non-conceptual
process. The only thing left is to show how this relationship entails
the possibility of universal appreciation of metaphors without uni
versal possession of non-conceptual genius. If we consider the other
characteristic of the second type of natural signs-that they are not
derived through experience-we must conclude, with Reid, that
their connections must be made known "by some original principle"
(LFA 30). This original principle is resolved by Reid "into the
constitution of human nature" (LFA 30). Since the second type of
natural sign must automatically be discovered by everyone since it
is within the"constitution of human nature," the ability to compre
hend similarities between natural signs and intellectual qualities in
cleverly constructed metaphors must be available to all.
It is true that "we find pleasure in discovering relations, simili
tudes, analogies, and even contrasts that are not obvious to every eye"
(ElP 497, my emphasis), but this process of 'discovering' (which is
not open to all) is different than the process of grasping similarities
already brought out through metaphor (which must be open to all
since the knowledge of how natural signs signify must be available
to all people as a part of their human constitution). The diHCOVl..!ring
process is an active one through which we conned [similitudcli and
analogies between things of very different nature] in our imagina
tion and ascribe to one what properly belongs to the other" (Ell' 497).
It is this activity which differentiates the two processes of metaphori
cal cognition (discovery and reception) and makes it possible for
Reid to claim that in one sense (the creative, active sense), the
similarities are not open to all but in another sense (the receptive
passive sense), since the similarities are based on the human consti
tution, they must be open to all.
The synthesis of Reid's theory of natural signs can fHI out some
of the ambiguities of Aristotle's otherwise outstanding theory of
metaphor. By pointing to similarities in Reid's natural signs as the
source of correctly executed metaphor, we can moke sense or
Aristotle's process of genius (as Reid's active process of imagina~
tion). Perhaps more importantly, we can resolve the difficulties
arising from the restriction of metaphor to those with genius while
the power of metaphor through comprehension remains available to
II
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all. In the end, the combination of Aristotle's theory of metaphor with
Reid's theory of natural signs gives us a solid explanation not only of
how metaphor functions, but how this functioning is possible with
a basis in the real properties that belong to actual things. 4

NOTES

Citations from Aristotle are abbreviated as follows: P==Poetics, R=Rhetoric and
M=Metaphysics.
2 All citations from Reid are abbreviated as follows: LFA=Lectures on the Fine Arts
in Thomas Reid's Lectures on the Fine Arts, EIP=Essays on the Intellectual Powers of
Man in The Works afThomas Reid, vol. 1., and II-lM;: Inquiry into the Human Mind
quoted from excerpts in Thomas Reid (page numbers given from Thomas Reid)
3 Since All Conceptual things are Teachable things, the contrapositive of this
statement, All non-Teachable things are non-Conceptual things, must be true.
4 I wish to thank Josefine Nauckhoff and Marcus Hester for their helpful
discussions about this paper.
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